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ABSTRACT
Research Summary
Combining insights from the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) with 
sociological research on local embeddedness, we propose that community 
oriented firms respond differently to performance relative to aspirations than
noncommunity oriented firms. Community oriented firms develop long-term 
relations with local constituents and emphasize community goals. This 
orientation should buffer them from the risk-inducing effects of falling below 
financial aspirations, and encourage them to pursue community goals more 
intensely when exceeding financial aspirations. Using U.S. bank data from 
2005-2013, we find that community orientation – exemplified by community-
banks – attenuates the influence of performance below aspirations on risk 
taking, but amplifies the influence of performance above aspirations on 
community investments such as small business loans. We discuss 
implications for a sociologically-informed view of performance feedback 
processes.
Managerial Summary
Relative to their size, locally-embedded community banks take less risk and 
make more small business loans than do larger banks. We find that they also
respond differently to performance relative to aspirations than do 
noncommunity banks. Specifically, while community oriented banks increase
risk taking when their performance is below aspirations, they do so less 
intensely than larger banks. This is because factors related to ownership and 
community embeddedness make such banks more risk-averse than large 
banks. Also, performance above aspirations provides freedom of action, and 
community banks use that freedom to increase small business lending. Such 
lending benefits the community and improves the business environment in 
which the community bank operates, important secondary goals to 
community-embedded firms. 
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars in the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) tradition explain multiple
firm behaviors as responses to patterns of success or failure in their 
performance (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March 1963). Performance 
relative to aspirations (PRA) – both positive and negative – can affect 
organizational actions in various ways. Performance below aspirations 
triggers actions aimed at improving performance, such as increased risk 
taking (Bromiley, 1991; Lim and McCann, 2013), mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) (Iyer and Miller, 2008), or new products launches (Eggers and Suh, 
2019), while performance above aspirations reduces those actions. PRA also 
shapes firm action by altering the allocation of attention (March, 1989). 
Firms that perform above aspirations direct energies towards unexploited 
opportunities (Zahra, 2005) or sequentially attend to lower priority goals that
decision makers might have previously overlooked (Greve, 2008; Greve and 
Gaba, 2017).
Although changing firm behavior as a response to PRA represents a 
general phenomenon (Bromiley, 2004; March, 1994), firms differ in how they 
interpret and react to this information. Firm responses to PRA vary with firm 
governance arrangements, resources, and organizational structures (Desai, 
2015; Joseph, Klingebiel, and Wilson, 2016; Kuusela, Keil, and Maula, 2017). 
Indeed, previous research has shown that a firm’s entrepreneurial (Hoskisson
et al., 2017; Naldi et al., 2007), strategic (Audia, Locke, and Smith, 2000; 
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Vissa, Greve, and Chen, 2010) or temporal (Bromiley and Souder, 2012) 
orientation can influence its response to PRA.
We build on this work to consider another key dimension of firm 
orientation, namely community embeddedness. Relative to noncommunity 
oriented firms, community oriented firms are more locally owned and 
managed, are smaller in size, operate within a limited geographic area, and 
pursue both financial and community goals (Almandoz, 2012). These 
features influence how these firms experience and behave in response to 
PRA. For instance, embeddedness encourages local ownership and control by
relatively undiversified owners and locally employed managers. This 
reduction in the separation of ownership and control should lead to smaller 
increases in risk taking when firms perform poorly relative to aspirations 
because locally-embedded owners and managers are more wary about 
potential firm failure. Also, embeddedness leads to greater emphasis on the 
secondary goal of community investment. Therefore, community oriented 
firms can take advantage of the leeway that they receive from exceeding 
aspirations by following their local preferences to increase attention to 
secondary community investment goals. In short, organizations with a 
community orientation should react differently to PRA than other firms. 
Accordingly, we consider a firm’s community orientation as new moderator 
of BTOF predictions. Specifically, we consider whether a bank is a community
bank or not (based on its size), and how this distinction influences its 
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responses to PRA regarding two types of bank behaviors, namely risk taking 
and community investment.
Due to their divergent orientations and behavior, observers often 
differentiate between community and noncommunity banks (FDIC, 2012; 
Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007), defining community banks as those with less 
than $1 billion in assets. Indeed, community banks differ markedly from 
noncommunity banks. For example, community banks generally take fewer 
risks than noncommunity banks (Almandoz, 2012) and allocate a much 
larger portion of their assets to small business loans (Berger and Udell, 
2002). Although less profitable than other lending (Mills and McCarthy, 2014;
Saari et al., 2014), small business loans are vital for local firm survival and 
job creation (DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell, 2004; Freeman and Audia, 2011). 
Their proclivity to take fewer risks and disproportionally engage in 
small business lending suggests that community banks will react differently 
than noncommunity banks to PRA. Relying on the sociological concept of 
local embeddedness (Almandoz, 2014; Marquis and Battilana, 2009), our 
theory distinguishes between two responses based on firm community 
embeddedness. First, we expect that community oriented firms express a 
differential attainment-induced response to risk taking. That is, community 
banks will increase their risk taking in response to performance below 
aspirations, but to a lesser extent than noncommunity banks. Second, we 
expect that community oriented firms will also express a sequential attention
to secondary goals response. That is, positive PRA will provide freedom of 
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action, and community banks will use that freedom to increase community 
investment, in the form of small business lending. 
We test our hypotheses using a 9-year panel dataset covering 11,364 
U.S. banks for the years 2005-2013. Supporting our hypotheses, we find that 
the effect of negative PRA on risk taking is half as large in community banks 
as in noncommunity banks, and positive PRA substantially increases small 
business lending in community banks but has no appreciable influence in 
noncommunity banks. 
Our study makes several contributions. First, we generate new theory 
that combines the BTOF with the sociological concept of local embeddedness
to elucidate the mechanisms by which PRA triggers different responses by 
community and noncommunity banks regarding credit risk and small 
business lending. Our theory suggests that a community orientation, through
its influence on the strategic and operational activities of firms, moderates 
BTOF predictions. Second, we add to the literature on local embeddedness 
by showing that community orientation can have significant implications for 
key measures of firm behavior, such as risk taking and community 
investment. Third, we contribute to research on adaptive behavior when 
dealing with multiple goals (e.g., Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009) by finding 
evidence that community oriented firms attend marginally more to 
secondary (community) goals after meeting primary (financial) goals. Finally,
we provide a constructive replication and extension of BTOF findings to a 
different industry (Bettis, Helfat, and Shaver, 2016), namely banking, taking 
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advantage of a large longitudinal sample of banks and developing robust 
measures of both organizational risk taking and community investment. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
PRA predictions are built on the BTOF tenet that differences between 
aspiration levels and expected performance influence firm behavior (Cyert 
and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958; Shinkle, 2012). With a few 
exceptions (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996), empirical 
applications have replaced expected performance with actual performance, 
measuring PRA as performance minus aspirations. Many of these 
applications consider how PRA influences risk taking (e.g., Bromiley, Miller 
and Rau, 2001; Bromiley and Rau, 2010), generally predicting that when 
performance falls below aspiration levels, risk taking should increase, and 
when performance exceeds aspiration levels, risk taking should decrease 
(e.g., Lim and McCann, 2014; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). BTOF studies also 
examine how PRA influences other types of firm behaviors, such as research 
and development (R&D) spending (Chen and Miller, 2007), capital 
expenditures (CAPX) (Audia and Greve, 2006; Bromiley and Souder, 2012), 
launching new products in different domains (Eggers and Suh, 2019), and 
M&A (Iyer and Miller, 2008).1 
1
 We do not develop and present the conventional hypotheses regarding the main 
effects that negative PRA increases firm risk and positive PRA reduces firm risk. 
These hypotheses have formed the basis of many papers since Bromiley (1991) 
introduced them to the literature, and have been tested numerous times, with most 
analyses providing robust support (Shinkle, 2011). Instead, we take this existing 
research as a baseline. Given the volume of work that has demonstrated support, it 
would be surprising to find a different relation. As such, our research focuses on 
how firm community orientation moderates that relation. However, our analyses 
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Community orientation – Early studies examining the contention that 
organizations alter their behavior based on their PRA assumed that all 
organizations reacted similarly to PRA, for instance by increasing risk in 
response to negative PRA (Bromiley, 1991; March, 1994). However, firms 
differ markedly in ways that could affect how they interpret and respond to 
PRA (Desai, 2015; Eggers and Suh, 2019; Joseph et al., 2016). Recent studies
find firm orientation – “the organizational processes, methods and styles that
firms use” (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996: 139) – can influence how organizations 
respond to PRA. For example, an entrepreneurial orientation moderates the 
influence of poor performance on firm risk taking (Hoskisson et al., 2017; 
Naldi et al., 2007). Studies have also examined how other dimensions of firm
orientation, including strategic (Audia et al., 2000; Gebauer, 2009; Vissa et 
al., 2010) and temporal orientations (Bromiley and Souder, 2012; Wang and 
Bansal, 2012), moderate firm responses to PRA.
Research has begun to examine how a community orientation – an 
orientation towards affiliation, engagement, and local social relationships
(Almandoz, 2012) – influences organizational responses to PRA. For example,
O’Brien and David (2014) show that Japanese firms embracing a 
communitarian orientation “pay back” to their stakeholders by investing in 
additional R&D when the firm performs above aspirations. Building on these 
insights, we expect that a local communitarian orientation influences firm 
responses to PRA. Despite globalizing forces, most organizations remain 
provide substantial support for the basic effect of PRA on organizational adaption.
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embedded in local social systems (Greenwood et al., 2010; Marquis and 
Battilana, 2009). Locally-embedded, community oriented firms have both 
different goals and methods than do other types of firms. They generally 
serve a smaller, bounded area and offer products and services that support 
that community (Almandoz, 2012). While profitability clearly remains a 
primary goal, managers in these firms also incorporate the needs of fellow 
community members into their decision criteria, and seek to provide 
something useful to the community, especially after satisfying the firm’s 
profit goals (Fauchart and Gruber, 2011; Seifert, Morris, and Bartkus, 2004). 
Local embeddedness makes community oriented firms more 
responsive to local stakeholders. Community stakeholders may mobilize local
opinion in favor of, or against, firms (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999), 
disproportionately influencing firms that rely on local employees, customers 
and funding (Bansal and Roth, 2000). Furthermore, local communities often 
monitor firm behavior (Desai, 2018) and may inflict substantial reputational 
and economic damage on organizations that deviate from local norms and 
expectations (Dorobantu, Henisz, and Nartey, 2017). At the same time, the 
personal status of owners and managers of community oriented firms often 
depends on the community’s perceptions of those firms. Thus, community 
oriented firms, which rely on local legitimacy, attend more to community 
stakeholders than do noncommunity oriented firms (Berrone et al., 2010).
Community banks exemplify the community oriented firm. Most 
community banks provide traditional banking services (as opposed to other, 
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more exotic banking services, such as investment banking or security 
trading) in their local communities (FDIC, 2012). Local residents often own 
and control community banks, and community banks depend on local 
citizens to deposit into and borrow from the bank (FDIC, 2012). Community 
banks generally vest lending discretion closer to the community, not being 
subject to the formal rules and procedures found in larger banks. In 
community banks, board sub-committees (usually including members of the 
local business community) often directly approve many lending decisions. 
Thus, community banks provide the traditional banking functions of lending 
and deposit taking, but only at a local community level.
These factors result in community banks having different goals than 
noncommunity banks. While primarily profit-seeking, community banks also 
attempt to meet the community’s needs. Attention to community needs 
translates into a greater allocation of resources to services that, although 
less profitable than competing investments, may provide a more substantial 
benefit to the community. For example, community banks provide a 
disproportionate amount of small business lending (FDIC, 2012; DeYoung, 
Hunter, Udell, 2004), lending which larger banks have sharply reduced due 
to lower profitability (Simon, 2015). While these loans make up a small 
amount of total banking assets, small business loans significantly influence 
local economies dependent on small businesses for employment and 
services (DeYoung et al., 2004). Community banks’ disproportionate small 
business lending demonstrates their commitment to the community, 
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because, “small business lending costs are high relative to the revenue 
potential” (Saari et al., 2014, p. 4). 
Community banks also operate differently than do noncommunity 
banks. While large banks depend almost exclusively on standardized credit 
scores and underwriting procedures to determine loan eligibility, community 
banks supplement these with local knowledge obtained through long-term 
relations. By focusing on a limited geographic area and customer base, 
community banks often have specialized knowledge of their local community
and their customers (Almandoz, 2014). This is why Elyasiani and Goldberg 
(2004) and others describe community banks as engaging in “relationship” 
as opposed to “transactional” banking.
Community banks also depend on the local community’s ecosystem for
on-going business in a way that noncommunity banks do not. A community 
bank’s success depends substantially on the economic success of the 
surrounding area. Local income translates into deposits, and local economic 
growth raises the demand for loans and other banking services. Whereas a 
large bank usually operates in many communities and can exit from a 
depressed community, a community bank generally operates in a single, 
limited, geographic region, and so depends heavily on the economic success 
of that region. 
In sum, community banks are locally-embedded organizations, with 
prominent non-financial goals of community investment (in addition to the 
primary goal of profitability) and specific community knowledge that 
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influences their lending decisions. Given a strong community orientation, 
they should react to PRA differently than noncommunity banks. In the next 
sections, we build on these insights to disentangle the PRA-based 
mechanisms related to two critical bank behaviors, namely risk taking and 
local investment.
Community orientation and the influence of negative PRA on risk 
taking
In general, BTOF scholars contend that when firms’ performance levels fall 
below their aspiration levels, firms take additional risk (Singh, 1986; 
Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996). Underperforming firms engage in risky 
activities with uncertain outcomes to turn around unacceptable performance 
or improve the firm’s position relative to other firms (Singh, 1986; Bromiley, 
1991). This dynamic seems particularly true in banking, where executives 
recognize that, to improve performance rapidly, underperforming banks 
often need to take on “additional risk by lowering credit standards.”2 Risk 
taking should result in greater variance in performance. While some firms 
will do much better and recover, some will do much worse and potentially 
fail (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 
2007).
However, community banks evidence different risk preferences than 
noncommunity banks and those different risk preferences should result in 
2
 Interview held with a senior VP of Credit Administration at a community bank. We 
describe in more detail the interviews conducted for this study in the Methods 
section.
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different responses to negative PRA (Sarasvathy, Simon, and Lave, 1998). 
Contrasting community and noncommunity banks, several factors result in 
lower risk preference for community banks, particularly when faced with 
lower performance.
Community banks differ in their ownership and management structure.
Noncommunity banks are generally publicly traded or owned by a large 
group of investors, while a small group of local individuals usually own 
community banks. In finance theory, diversified shareholders prefer that 
firms invest in all positive net present value projects, even if this increases 
unsystematic risk and the likelihood of failure. Indeed, much of the change in
compensation for top management sparked by agency theory has been 
directed at increasing managerial risk-taking (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, 
and Franco-Santos, 2010). For such banks, increasing risk is an obvious 
solution to negative PRA. 
In contrast, the ownership and management structure of community 
banks encourages them to be less susceptible to the risk-inducing effects of 
negative PRA. Community banks often have a small number of investors for 
whom the bank constitutes a major investment. For such investors, concern 
about unsystematic risk is rational. The owners of community banks, akin to 
those of family firms, may want to avoid risks that increase the chances of 
failure or losing strategic control of the bank (Kavadis and Castañer, 2015; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Community bank owners (and managers) are 
often part of that community themselves, such that a bank failure would 
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damage their local reputation and social connections (Freeman and Audia, 
2011; Sutton and Callahan, 1987). While large bank investors only lose 
money if the bank does poorly, the community bank investor often loses 
both money and social status. Consequently, community bank owners should
have lower risk preference than large bank owners, which should reduce 
their tendency to increase risk taking as a response to negative PRA.
Managers in community banks are cognizant of their owners’ concerns,
and often share them. Therefore, they limit their tendency to increase risk in 
response to negative PRA (Desai, 2015). A VP-level community bank 
executive confirmed this to one of the authors of this study, stating that in 
their bank, “there’s not the sort of the risky mentality that you might find at 
a financial institution where somebody is not all-in from an ownership 
standpoint.” Indeed, the factors that would influence community bank 
owners to rely less on risk taking in response to negative PRA should also 
apply to managers. While a professional manager in a large bank can readily 
move to other branches or other banks if the current branch performs poorly,
managers in community banks often have substantial stakes in the bank and
limited mobility given their local embeddedness. As such, lower geographic 
mobility should also lead community banks managers to be less prone to risk
taking as a response to negative PRA.
In addition, the combination of negative PRA and higher risk creates 
greater problems for community banks than noncommunity banks. Low 
performance itself increases the chances of failure more in community 
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banks. Community banks have less access to capital markets than do larger 
noncommunity banks, giving them less potential slack and ability to adapt to
possible negative outcomes (Bourgeois, 1981). Having a narrower range of 
products and operating in fewer geographic areas, community banks are less
diversified than noncommunity banks. Consequently, proportionate amounts 
of credit risk (relative to bank size) will result in greater failure risk in 
community banks than in larger banks. In addition, the normal remedies to 
financial distress (such as firing employees) are less readily available to 
community banks. In community banks, owners, managers and employees 
all come from the same community, owners and managers often know all the
staff personally, and may meet employees in non-business situations. In 
contrast, owners and managers in the largest banks seldom personally know 
the employees being “down-sized” and seldom meet such employees in non-
bank situations. At the extreme, the largest banks (termed too-big-to-fail 
banks) may even expect a political bailout if the bank faces insolvency. 
Consequently, because financial distress causes more difficulties for a 
community bank than a noncommunity bank, situations (specifically 
negative PRA) that will induce risk taking in all banks should do so in 
community banks to a lesser extent, than they would in noncommunity 
banks.
Of course, lending implies risk. To make a profit, banks must make 
loans which might not be repaid. Accordingly, our arguments are not about 
absolute levels of risk preference but rather about differences in the 
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marginal response to the risk-inducing effects of negative PRA due to 
community embeddedness. For the reasons noted above, we expect that 
community banks will respond to the risk-inducing effects of negative PRA, 
but will do so with less intensity, than noncommunity banks. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The negative relation between negative performance
relative to aspirations and risk taking will be weaker for 
community banks.
Embeddedness, positive feedback and attention to secondary goals
As we note above, local embeddedness leads to placing greater 
importance on community goals. Positive PRA should give managers leeway 
to follow their local preferences. Indeed, managers of community banks want
to provide small business loans, but cannot do so for various reasons. 
Positive PRA lifts some of these constraints, allowing managers of community
banks to follow their local preferences and fund more local investments. 
Therefore, as community oriented firms meet and exceed their primary profit
goals, we expect that they will shift their attention towards secondary 
community goals. 
In general, the BTOF views aspiration levels as independent constraints
of differing importance (Simon, 1964), with firms attending to goals 
sequentially. That is, “decision makers attend to one goal at a time and 
move on to the next goal when performance on the first is above the 
aspiration level” (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 117-119; Greve, 2008, p. 480). 
In this formulation, firms that exceed their primary goal (normally financial 
performance) then switch their attention fully to their secondary goal (such 
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as community investment). However, organizational reality is rarely this 
clean cut; firms do not entirely ignore a secondary goal before meeting their 
primary goal, and completely ignore their primary goal when they pass a 
threshold.3 This is especially true in banking, where remaining profitable is 
critical because important stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and regulators) 
continuously monitor the financial condition of the bank. Instead, we relax 
the assumptions of sequential attention, and theorize that exceeding a 
primary financial goal allows firms to marginally increase their attention to 
secondary goals. 
This increase in attention to non-financial goals should influence 
resource-allocation (i.e., investment) decisions among competing strategic 
options (Keum and Eggers, 2018). For example, previous research has shown
that exceeding aspirations lets managers focus on the long-term, increasing 
the durability of firms’ capital expenditures (Bromiley and Souder, 2012) and
the number of socially-responsible activities they pursue (Wang and Bansal, 
2012). 
One key secondary goal in community banks is funding small 
businesses. Community banks are key drivers of entrepreneurship because 
community banks provide a disproportionate amount of small business 
lending. For example, in our sample of U.S. banks in 2012, community banks 
held only about six percent (6%) of banking industry assets, but provided 
37% of small business loans. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
3
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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(Simon, 2015), firms with fewer than 500 employees, the types of firms that 
receive small business loans, account for more than half of all private sector 
jobs in the U.S. Therefore, small business loans are crucial to local 
employment. However, despite their importance to local communities, small 
business loans are less profitable than other competing investments because
they undergo the same approval processes and face the same regulatory 
burden as larger loans, resulting in much higher administrative costs relative
to loan size. As such, large banks have drastically reduced their small 
business lending (Simon, 2015). 
Community banks may have a goal of providing small business loans, 
despite its lower profitability, as a way to “give back” to their communities. 
However, for-profit community banks do not make investments in small 
business loans out of charity. Instead, small loans can drive the local 
ecosystem, where community banks derive all of their business (ICBA, 2017).
Successful small businesses increase local employment and wealth, leading 
to increases in deposits and demand for loans. In contrast, large banks do 
not see a dominant share of the “local” business around their locations, and 
thus do not benefit from financial ecosystem externalities in the same way 
that community banks do. Therefore, the financial returns (including these 
externalities) to small business lending differ greatly by bank type, and 
community banks often provide this essential community investment 
function that large banks neglect. 
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However, small business loans’ lower profitability restricts the ability of
community bank managers to provide such loans. Community banks are not 
charities; shareholders of such banks expect profitable returns on their 
investments, and banking regulators also expect profits to maintain the 
safety and soundness of the bank. Also, compared to noncommunity banks, 
community banks have fewer resources to invest in small loans. 
Positive PRA can partially loosen these constraints, providing 
community banks with more leeway to invest in secondary community goals,
such as small loans. Positive PRA relieves pressure from shareholders and 
regulators seeking greater profit (Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1993; 
Kacperczyk, 2009). Positive PRA also lifts resource constraints (Kuusela et al.,
2017), as profits generate cash the community banks can use to make small 
business loans. Banks can then increase their portfolio of small business 
loans rapidly because, unlike long-term investments such as CAPX or R&D, 
such loans come due regularly, allowing banks to expand (or contract) their 
loan portfolio easily, based on their financial performance. However, this 
disposition to invest in less profitable loans that support community goals 
would only exist for firms that embrace a community orientation (Almandoz, 
2014).
An alternative mechanism may encourage community bank 
investment in small business loans; community banks have less access to 
some types of high-return investments than larger banks. With a limited 
geographic reach and limited product portfolios, small business loans may 
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simply be one of the few available avenues for community banks to use their
assets, particularly when those assets grow due to high profits. Banks can 
only issue loans to borrowers who want the loans and meet the loan criteria –
such borrowers may be limited in a community bank’s geographic region. In 
contrast, large banks can easily move funds from low growth areas to areas 
with high growth (and high demand for loans and bank services) both 
domestically and internationally or invest the funds in alternative activities 
like trading.
In sum, positive PRA provides resources and lets community banks 
satisfy their profit goals. This allows community banks greater leeway to 
attend to their secondary community goals, such as funding local 
businesses. Given community banks’ proclivity towards small business 
lending, positive PRA should further increase their investment in small 
business lending. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The positive relation between positive performance 
relative to aspirations and small business lending will be 
stronger for community banks.
METHODS
Sample – Previous strategy research has examined a wide variety of 
outcomes using banking data, including risk taking (McNamara and Bromiley,
1997), market entry (Knott and Posen, 2005), M&A success (Marquis and 
Lounsbury, 2007; Zollo and Singh, 2004), geographic diversification (Marquis
and Huang, 2010), deviation from established policies (Ramanujam, 2003; 
Sutcliffe and McNamara, 2001), top management turnover (Semadeni et al., 
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2008) and the performance implications of banks’ role as intermediaries
(Saparito, Chen, and Sapienza, 2004; Sasson, 2008). For example,
McNamara and Bromiley (1997), using actual lending decisions, found that 
profitability pressures influence risk taking by causing banks to give 
customers overly favorable risk ratings.
Banks must disclose their balance sheet, income and other financial 
information in “Call Reports” made publicly available by regulators
(Avraham, Selvaggi, and Vickery, 2012). SNL Financial collects this data 
which we use for our empirical analysis. As such, our sample consists of data 
on substantially all federally insured commercial banking institutions, both 
publically traded and private, for our time period. Our analysis uses an 
unbalanced panel dataset of 73,401 observations for 11,364 firms for the 
years 2005-2013. We chose this period because it is what was available from
SNL Financial at the time of our study. Because we lag all control and 
independent variables one year, those variables cover the period from 2005 
to 2012, while our dependent variables cover the period from 2006 to 2013.
To better understand our context, we also interviewed 13 members of 
the banking industry including 4 CEOs of community banks, the CFO and 4 
VP-level executives from two different community banks, and 3 high ranking 
executives, and 1 former high ranking executive, from several large 
international banks. The interviews averaged an hour in length. Most of 
these interviews were held in person and recorded. Also, one of the authors 
attended a bank’s annual shareholders meeting. These interviews allowed us
20
to test the face validity of our measures and better ground our hypotheses in
corporate reality.
Dependent variables – We measure risk taking using credit risk. Credit risk
“refers to the risk that a borrower defaults on any type of debt by failing to 
make required payments” (Bessis, 2015, pg. 199). We chose credit risk as 
our dependent variable because “credit risk is the primary driver of risk for 
most banks, although other risks obviously exist” (Jiménez, Lopez, and 
Saurina, 2013, pg. 188). As banks make loans, they incur the risk that those 
loans will not be repaid, i.e., credit risk (McNamara and Bromiley, 1999). 
Credit risk is a good measure of bank risk taking because, “the most 
substantial asset classification on the bank’s balance sheet consists of loans”
(Allen and Saunders, 2015, pg. 162), and credit risk measures the risk of 
default on those loans (Bessis, 2015). 
We use three indicators to measure our construct of credit risk: (i) 
allowance for loan losses/total assets, (ii) provision for loan losses/total 
assets, and (iii) net loan charge-offs/total assets (Kolari et al., 2002). An 
allowance is a negative entry under assets reducing the value of assets to 
compensate for the expected defaults or other problems in loan repayment,4 
while provision for loan losses is the income statement entry associated with 
changes in the allowance. Net loan charge-offs are the actual loan losses 
recognized in a given period. Textbook treatments of credit risk consider 
these the three main credit risk measures (e.g., Bessis, 2015). Following
4
 https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/alll.htm.
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Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman (2013), we factor analyzed these three 
measures of credit risk. Our factor analysis produced a single factor 
explaining 81.7% of the variance with an Eigenvalue of 2.45. This analysis 
supports grouping these three variables in a composite score for credit risk. 
Therefore, we calculated a single credit risk score as the standardized factor 
score for this common factor. A higher score on this variable corresponds to 
greater risk taking. 
We use small business loans, our second dependent variable, as our 
measure of community investment. We calculated this variable as the log of 
the total dollar amount of small business loans that the bank has 
outstanding. Small business loans include commercial and industrial loans 
“with principal less than or equal to $1 million, which are typically extended 
to small firms” and not secured by farm or nonresidential properties (Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, 2017, pg. 8). Federal regulations require that 
banks disclose the number and amount of small business loans in their Call 
Reports (FDIC, 2016). We take the log of small loans to reduce skewness and
kurtosis. 
In the Online Appendix, we provide a more detailed description of our 
reasons for choosing these two dependent variables.
Independent variables – PRA is normally calculated as firm performance 
minus aspirations. Researchers construct aspirations using either the 
performance of comparable organizations (social aspirations) or the 
organization’s past performance (historical aspirations). We test our 
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hypotheses using both types of aspirations, with broadly consistent results. 
We estimate separate models with performance relative to social aspirations 
and performance relative to historical aspirations. Bromiley and Harris (2014)
found models including separate values for the two aspirations empirically 
preferable to weighted aspirations models, which combine social and 
historical aspiration through user-defined weighting. We deviate from
Bromiley and Harris (2014) in that we estimate separate models for historical
and social aspirations to avoid having two measures of a similar construct in 
a given estimation model. However, our results are consistent when 
including both social and historical aspirations in the same model.
We measure social aspirations by the industry median return on assets
(ROA) (Mezias, Chen, and Murphy, 2002; Miller and Bromiley, 1990) and 
measure PRA as the difference between the firm’s performance and the 
industry median ROA in the prior year (time t-1). For robustness, we also 
used the mean industry ROA, with similar results. Social aspirations reflect 
the fact that banks closely monitor the performance of other banks, 
especially because the performance of other banks significantly influences 
the banks’ own competitiveness (Kane, 1996; Kim and Miner, 2007; Knott 
and Posen, 2005). Moreover, the FDIC regularly collects and discloses 
industry-level financial performance in the banking industry, and produces a 
quarterly report that, “provides a comprehensive summary of the most 
current financial results for the banking industry.”5 Industry ROA appears on 
5
 https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/.
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the first page of these reports, indicating it represents a suitable and easily 
observable benchmark for setting aspiration levels. 
We measure historical aspirations as the prior year’s performance (i.e.,
ROA) and measure PRA as the difference between the current year’s 
performance and the previous year’s performance. Because we lag these 
variables, historical PRA equals the difference between firm performance in 
t-1 and t-2. 
Because our theory posits that exceeding and falling below aspiration 
levels have different effects, we calculate separate variables for negative 
and positive PRA. We measure negative PRA as zero if PRA is positive, and 
equal to PRA if it is negative. Similarly, we measure positive PRA as zero if 
the PRA is negative, and equal to the PRA if it is positive. Accordingly, our 
measures indicate not only if the firm exceeds or falls below aspirational 
level, but also by how much. These measures follow previous research (e.g., 
Desai, 2015; Lim and McCann, 2013). To address potential outliers, we follow
Bromiley and Harris (2014) and winsorize these independent variables at the
two percent (2%) level. Our results are also robust to not winsorizing, and to 
winsorizing at the 1% and 5% levels.
Following previous financial literature, we measure community bank as
a binary variable, equal to zero (0) if the bank’s total assets exceed $1 
billion, and equal to one (1) if the bank’s total assets do not exceed that 
amount (e.g. DeYoung, Hunter, & Udell, 2004; Hays, De Lurigo, & Gilbert, 
2009). For robustness, we replicated the analysis using a $1.2 billion cutoff 
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and a $0.8 billion cutoff. We obtained similar results (available on request) at
all three cutoff levels. 
Controls – We include numerous variables to control for factors which may 
influence the overall level of risk taking and small business investment. 
Larger firms may engage in more risk taking and community investment 
because they have greater scale (Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998). As such, we
control for firm size, which we measure as the log of total employees. Firms 
with higher profits and assets could engage in more risk taking and 
community investment. Accordingly, we control for multiple measures of firm
financial condition. More specifically, we control for profitability (net interest 
income/total assets), capitalization (total equity/total assets), liquidity (total 
securities/total assets), and liabilities (certificates of deposit/total deposits). 
We also constructed a product concentration measure by taking the sum of 
squared ratios of consumer loans, real estate loans, agriculture loans, and 
total securities to total assets. These controls are, “fairly standard measures 
of bank condition that regulators, investors, and other interested parties 
monitor over time in performance evaluations” (Kolari et al., 2002, pg. 367). 
To control for banks engaging in trading and investment banking 
activities, fundamentally different businesses than retail and commercial 
banking, we controlled for the log of bank revenue in investment banking, 
underwriting and advising activities (I-bank fees), and for revenue the bank 
earned in trading for its own account (trading revenue). We scaled trading 
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revenue by 1,000,000 for ease of interpretability. We did not take the natural
log of trading revenue due to the large number of negative values.
Loan demand could influence small business lending. Consequently, 
we include the total number of approved loans guaranteed by the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (SBA) in the state in which the focal bank is 
headquartered. The SBA does not directly grant loans, but provides a 
government-backed partial guarantee that enables third-parties (banks and 
credit unions) to issue small business credit. The SBA will reimburse lenders 
from 50 to 85% of the loan amount if the borrower defaults. While this 
reduces the down-side risk of SBA loans, such loans still require full up-front 
funding from the lender. Our SBA loans measure includes approved loans 
from both the SBA 504 and the SBA 7(a) programs, which directly target to 
small business and entrepreneurs. A higher value of this variable represents 
a greater demand for small business loans. We obtained data on SBA loans 
from the agency’s website.6 We scaled SBA loans by 1,000 for ease of 
interpretability. Both large and small banks can participate in the SBA loan 
program.
We also control for whether the bank is de novo, i.e., in existence for 
fewer than five years and founded by individuals with no corporate parent. 
De novo banks face greater regulation in their first five years (Almandoz, 
2012). Also, de novo banks provide a higher percentage of small business 
loans than more established banks (e.g., Goldberg & White, 1998). We take 
6
 https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-performance/open-government/foia/frequently-
requested-records/sba-7a-504-loan-data-reports.
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this data from SNL Financial’s comprehensive list of de novo banks. Finally, 
we include year dummy variables to control for the influence of specific 
years and other time-dependent variation, and to mitigate the issue of 
contemporaneous correlation in panel data. 
Estimation methods – We use a fixed effects estimation model because 
our theorizing deals with within-bank changes over time. We lag all 
independent and control variables one year, and we account for robust 
clustered standard errors at the bank level. By using a fixed effects 
estimation model (which accounts for stable firm characteristics), including 
year dummies, and lagging all independent and control variables, we 
strengthen our ability to make causal inferences from our data.
RESULTS
Table 1 reports selected summary statistics comparing community and 
noncommunity banks. Table 2 reports the summary statistics and 
correlations for our dependent and independent variables. Tables 3 and 4 
present the results of our estimates using credit risk as the dependent 
variable. Tables 5 and 6 present our results using small business loans as the
dependent variable. We show our results in a hierarchical fashion. The 
maximum variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables in all
our models is less than three (3), and the mean VIF was 1.6 indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a concern.
- Insert Tables 1-4 and Figs. 1a & 1b about here -
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Table 1 demonstrates that community and noncommunity banks differ 
markedly. Although by definition community banks are much smaller (mean 
assets $233 million versus $24.3 billion for noncommunity banks), they take 
less credit risk than noncommunity banks (mean credit risk of -0.01 versus 
0.43 for noncommunity banks). This means that community banks average 
slightly below the industry mean credit risk, while noncommunity banks 
average almost one half a standard deviation above the industry mean. 
Community banks also engage in much less “nonstandard” banking, with 
trading revenue averaging 0.3% of net income for community banks versus 
25% for noncommunity banks, and investment bank fees averaging 4.7% of 
net income for community versus 48% for noncommunity banks.
Examining correlations in Table 2, positive and negative social PRA and
negative historical PRA associate negatively with credit risk. The association 
of positive historical PRA with credit risk is close to zero. Since lower 
performance corresponds to more negative PRA, this suggests that as 
performance goes further below aspirations, banks overall increase credit 
risk. No such association appears for positive PRA. However, these bivariate 
analyses lack controls, such that we now turn to the full model estimates. 
Table 3 reports results showing the effect of social PRA and community
banks on credit risk, while Table 4 reports results showing the effect of 
historical PRA and community banks on credit risk. Given the similarity of 
results using the two different measures of PRA, we discuss the results of 
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Tables 3 and 4 together. To avoid omitted variable bias, we interpret the 
fully saturated models (Models 5 and 10).
Tables 3 and 4 confirm our assumption that negative PRA increases 
risk taking for noncommunity banks for both social and historical aspirations 
(b = - 92.6, p < 0.001; b = - 161.9, p < 0.001, respectively). Because we 
include a dummy for community banks and interact this with social and 
historical aspirations, the main effects on social and historical aspirations are
the effects for noncommunity banks.
H1 predicts that the negative relation between negative PRA and risk 
taking will be weaker for community banks. Consistent with H1, in Model 5 of
Table 3 the coefficient of the interaction term between negative social PRA 
and community bank is positive with an extremely low p value (b = 48.95, p 
< 0.001). Similarly, in Model 10 of Table 4 the coefficient of the interaction 
between negative historical PRA and community bank is positive with an 
extremely low p value (b = 87.18, p < 0.001). These p values indicate that 
we can be confident the observed parameters differ from zero. 
Figure 1a graphs the effect of the interaction of negative social PRA 
and being a community bank on predicted credit risk, while Figure 1b graphs
the interaction effect using negative historical PRA. The graphs are very 
similar, and show credit risk increases as negative PRA becomes more 
negative, but that this effect is much greater for noncommunity banks than 
for community banks (i.e., the line is much steeper). Further, the predicted 
values for noncommunity banks appear above those for community banks, 
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aligning with prior research finding community banks take less credit risk 
than noncommunity banks. 
The difference between community and noncommunity banks has both
statistical and practical significance. Because we derive our measure of 
credit risk from a factor analysis with no inherent economic scale, we provide
effect sizes in terms of standard deviations. A two standard deviation 
reduction in negative social PRA raises predicted credit risk by over one 
standard deviation (1.21 SD) for noncommunity banks, but only by about 
one-half a standard deviation (0.57 SD) for community banks. Similarly, a 
two standard deviation reduction in negative historical PRA raises predicted 
credit risk by more than one standard deviation (1.34 SD) for noncommunity 
banks, but by a little over one-half a standard deviation (0.62 SD) for 
community banks. Thus, the effect of negative PRA, using either social or 
historical measures, on credit risk in noncommunity banks is more than twice
as large as it is in community banks.
Regarding the control variables, firm size, State SBA loans, fees, 
profitability, liabilities, and diversification associate with higher credit risk 
while liquidity, small business loans, and being a de novo bank associate 
with lower credit risk. While the influence of being a community bank varies 
with performance level, a community bank with performance equal to the 
social or historical aspirations level engages in less credit risk than a 
noncommunity bank (b = - 0.356, p < 0.001 for social and b = - 0.168, p < 
0.001 for historical). 
30
We did not offer hypotheses regarding the effect of positive PRA on 
credit risk. However, we note that our results are generally consistent with 
the BTOF prediction that firms with positive PRA decrease their risk taking. 
For community banks, the overall effects of positive social PRA and positive 
historical PRA are negative and statistically significant. In noncommunity 
banks, positive social PRA has a negative and statistically significant 
influence on credit risk, but positive historical PRA has a positive and 
statistically significant influence. 
- Insert Tables 5 & 6 and Figs 2a and 2b about here-
Moving to small business loans (Tables 5 and 6, models 15 and 20), 
regarding our assumption of the main effect, for noncommunity banks, we 
find a small and statistically non-significant influence of positive social PRA 
on small business loans (b = 1.027, p = 0.851), and a negative significant 
influence of positive historical PRA on small business loans (b = - 28.467, p <
0.001). 
H2 predicts that the positive relation between positive PRA and small 
business lending will be stronger for community banks. Consistent with H2, 
in Model 15 of Table 5 the coefficient of the interaction term between 
positive social PRA and community bank is positive with an extremely low p 
value (b = 22.14, p < 0.001), and in Model 20 of Table 6 the coefficient of 
the interaction term between positive historical PRA and community bank is 
positive with an extremely low p value (b = 24.11, p < 0.001). Again, these p
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values indicate that we can be highly confident that the true parameter 
differs from zero.
Figure 2a graphs the interaction effect of positive social PRA and 
community bank on small business loans. The graph shows that small 
business loans increase as positive social PRA increases in community banks,
but not in noncommunity banks. Figure 2b graphs the effect of the 
interaction of positive historical PRA and community bank on small business 
loans. The graph shows that small business loans decrease as positive 
historical PRA increases in noncommunity banks, but not in noncommunity 
banks. For community banks, small business loans remain steady as positive 
historical PRA increases. 
Again, this difference is substantively important. For noncommunity 
banks, positive social PRA does not affect small business lending. However, a
two-standard deviation increase in positive PRA increases small business 
lending in community banks by approximately 30.6%. Considering that 
community banks in our sample have an average portfolio value of small 
business loans of approximately $13 million, this leads to an increase of 
approximately $3,913,000 in small business loans. With respect to positive 
historical PRA, for community banks, positive historical PRA does not affect 
small business lending. However, a two-standard deviation increase in 
positive PRA decreases small business lending in noncommunity banks by 
approximately 20.4%. 
32
Regarding the control variables, firm size, State SBA loans, liabilities, 
diversification, and de novo bank associate with higher small business 
lending while profitability, capitalization, liquidity, and credit risk associate 
with lower small business lending. While the influence of being a community 
bank varies with performance level, a community bank with performance 
equal social aspirations engages in more small business loans than a 
noncommunity bank (b = 0.264, p < 0.001).  
While we did not offer hypotheses regarding the effect of negative PRA
on small business lending, we note that, in community banks the coefficient 
of negative social and historical PRA is positive and significant, indicating a 
negative influence on small business lending (i.e., more negative PRA means
a decrease in small business lending). For noncommunity banks, negative 
social and historical PRA also reduce small business lending, but to a higher 
degree than for community banks. This evidence suggests that banks do not 
increase small business loans to solve a low PRA problem.
Overall, these results confirm the prediction that being a community 
bank influences how firms respond to PRA. As a final consideration, we also 
note that our results support the main tenets of BTOF research on PRA, 
namely that negative PRA motivates differing resource allocation and that 
positive PRA decreases risk (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003). Indeed, our 
models show that, on average, negative PRA leads to lower levels of small 
business lending and that positive PRA leads to a decrease in risk-taking. 
Although we took these effects as a baseline – to focus on the moderating 
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effect of being a community bank – we find robust validation of this general 
mechanism in our banking sample.
Robustness checks and alternative specifications
We defined being community bank using a cutoff in assets, which 
results in some firms switching between community and noncommunity. As 
an alternative test, we estimated separate models only using banks always 
classified as either community and banks always classified as noncommunity
(please refer to Online Appendix). This split-sample design allowed us to 
focus only on the time series variation of interest (i.e., PRA) precluding the 
possibility of variations in being a community bank. Our results were 
consistent with the analyses we present here. The only potentially 
interesting difference was that the effect of positive historical PRA increasing
risk taking in noncommunity banks was not paralleled by our original 
analyses, which included all banks. The difference between historical and 
social PRA in noncommunity banks merits future research consideration. We 
include a more complete description of these results in the Online Appendix.
We also performed numerous additional analyses to test the 
robustness of our results. We include the descriptions of these additional 
analyses in the Online Appendix. 
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we combine the BTOF theory of how organizations respond to 
performance feedback with sociological concept of community 
embeddedness to show how community orientation influences firm 
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responses to performance relative to aspirations (PRA). We predict and show 
that community banks, smaller firms that exhibit a local community 
orientation and pursue both financial and community goals (Almandoz, 
2014), respond differently than noncommunity banks do to PRA. More 
specifically, we differentiate between two responses based on the features of
locally embedded firms. First, we find that community oriented firms express
a different PRA-induced response to risk taking. While both community and 
noncommunity banks increase their risk taking in response to negative PRA 
(as the BTOF would predict), community banks do so to a lesser extent than 
noncommunity banks do. Second, we find a sequential attention to 
secondary goals response. That is, positive PRA lets community banks 
pursue a secondary goal of community support. Specifically, community 
banks increase small business loans with increasing positive social PRA while
noncommunity banks do not, and community banks hold constant small 
business loans with increasing historical PRA, while noncommunity decrease 
such loans. 
Our study makes several contributions. First, we extend the BTOF by 
showing that a community orientation moderates its predictions. This 
contributes to the growing literature exploring the link between aspirations 
and firm orientation (e.g., Audia et al., 2000; Bromiley and Souder, 2012; 
Gebauer, 2009; Simsek, Heavey, and Veiga, 2010). By adding community 
orientation to the BTOF tradition, we respond to calls for a socially-
embedded view on the process of adaptation to PRA (Gavetti, Levinthal, and 
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Ocasio, 2007; O’Brien and David, 2014). This view seeks to deepen 
understanding of how a firm’s orientation shapes decision making, affecting 
interpretation and response to PRA. Also, it allows us to strengthen theory-
building by exploring the boundary conditions where BTOF predictions may 
need further refinement. 
Second, we add to the literature showing that community orientation 
leads to strategic and operational choices that have important implications 
for key firm behaviors, such as risk taking and community investment. Prior 
BTOF research shows that Japanese firms (assumed to be more 
communitarian than U.S. firms) tend to increase R&D investments with 
positive PRA as a way to “pay forward” to their stakeholders by enabling 
future opportunities (O’Brien and David, 2014). O’Brien and David (2014) 
also showed variation in ownership changed the influence of PRA on R&D. 
Our study builds on this research to examine how differences in (local) 
community orientation in U.S. banks influence both risk taking and 
community investment. Community oriented firms develop organizational 
characteristics which increase risk aversion, translating into a lower risk 
taking as a solution to poor performance. Also, parallel to O’Brien and 
David’s (2014) “pay forward” concept, community banks use the leeway 
from positive PRA to “pay forward” to community stakeholders by supporting
local businesses, even at the cost of lower short-term returns. 
Third, our study adds to the growing research on adaption to PRA when
addressing multiple goals (e.g., Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2009; Gaba and 
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Bhattacharya, 2012). This research focuses on how firms manage multiple 
goals that lead to conflicting courses of action (e.g., Audia & Brion, 2007; 
Dye, Eggers, & Shapira, 2014) or are managed differently depending on the 
processing unit (e.g., Gaba and Joseph, 2013; Joseph and Gaba, 2015). Other
studies in this stream focus on how performance interacts with different 
goals, including externally imposed rankings (Rowley, Shipilov, and Greve, 
2017), innovation objectives (Gaba and Bhattacharya, 2012), and social 
goals (Stevens et al., 2015). 
Our study complements these efforts by examining how positive PRA 
enables locally-embedded firms to attend to the goal of “giving back” to 
their communities by shifting their resource allocation and, in our case, by 
increasing their emphasis on local lending. Both our quantitative results and 
qualitative insights suggest that community oriented firms attend to multiple
goals sequentially, first emphasizing the higher-priority goal of performance 
and then increasing attention to secondary community objectives. However, 
we relax sequential goal theory’s strong assumption of goal switching. In our 
context, such a view would suggest that banks either “ignore” (secondary) 
local lending goals until they satisfy (primary) profit goals (which is untrue 
because community banks issue small loans all the time), or start ignoring 
profit goals the moment they pass a certain threshold (which is highly 
unlikely given their high scrutiny). Instead, we advance a more general (and 
nuanced) mechanism, namely that exceeding expectations on a primary goal
allows firms to marginally increase their attention to a secondary goal. In a 
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mirror image of how agency theorists argue free cash flow (which has a 
strong association with high performance) frees self-interested managers to 
indulge in self-enriching behaviors (Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx, 2000), 
high performance allows community-oriented firms indulge in less self-
interested, community objectives. 
While we limited our analysis to the banking sector, our mechanism of 
how firms attend to financial and community goals potentially could apply to 
many organizations. The vast majority of organizations still operate at a local
level and within geographical boundaries (Marquis and Battilana, 2009), 
suggesting that a substantial number of these firms may develop complex 
goal structures and that local norms of reciprocity play a significant role in 
their resource allocation decisions. Moreover, novel organizational forms 
such as “benefit corporations” and social enterprises expressly pursue 
multiple goals besides profits (Murray, 2012; Stevens et al., 2015). This 
increases the set of firms with more complex goal structures that incorporate
profitability with other non-financial goals, such as supporting the 
community.
Fourth, we provide an empirical contribution by extending and 
replicating BTOF findings using aggregate data from the banking industry. 
The bulk of BTOF literature examines manufacturing firms (e.g., Lim and 
McCann, 2013). Much of the previous banking research from the BTOF
(McNamara and Bromiley, 1997, 1999; McNamara, Moon, and Bromiley, 
2002; Sutcliffe and McNamara, 2001) focuses on individual loan decisions 
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rather than aggregate bank activities. Other behavioral work using bank data
looks at vicarious learning (Kim and Miner, 2007), market expansion
(Barreto, 2009), and determination of aspirations (Mezias et al., 2002). Our 
sample permits us to replicate and extend BTOF predictions to aggregate 
firm outcomes in an industry where risk taking differs fundamentally from 
that in manufacturing firms. Thus, we increase the BTOF’s generalizability by
validating its main tenets in an alternative sample (Bettis et al., 2016), 
namely banking (see also Wiseman and Catanach, 1997). Also, our measure 
of credit risk allows us to more directly gauge risk taking, thereby responding
to recent calls to develop more robust risk taking measures (Bromiley, Rau, 
and Zhang, 2017; Holmes et al., 2011).
Our study, like all studies, has limitations. We focused on credit risk 
and small business lending as proxies for risk taking and community 
investment, respectively. While we believe that credit risk is the most 
relevant measure of risk as a response to poor performance, since relaxing 
lending standards lies within bank control, some banks may choose to 
increase other risks, such as M&A or expansion. Similarly, community goals 
could go beyond small business lending, which banks may still justify on 
economic terms, to more altruistic investments in the community, such as 
local philanthropy. Accordingly, future research could examine how a 
community orientation shapes philanthropy and how this effect interacts 
with PRA. Second, there are some challenges in comparing community and 
noncommunity banks. As we note above, they differ sharply not only in size 
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and geographic scope, but also in their business models. Therefore, 
comparisons between these types of organizations should be done 
cautiously. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Selected Descriptive Statistics – Community and Noncommunity Banks
 
Community Banks Noncommunity Banks
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Total assets (000) 232,917 225,642 1,391 999,448
24,300,0
00
145,000,
000 1,000,000 2,420,000,000
Credit risk -0.01 1.32 -12.35 53.89 0.43 1.93 -2.27 33.13
Small loans 12,866 20,192 0 272,773 146,586 787,960 0 25,500,000
ROA 0.01 0.02 -1.39 2.22 0.01 0.02 -0.30 0.27
Trading revenue 
(000) 4.88 226 -7675 16,306
41,630.5
3 717,598 -26,200,000 19,800,000
I bank fees (000) 69.25 500.18 -66.00 31,805 79,614 840,800 -2 18,700,000
Net income (000) 1,427 5,508 -351,000 439,941 166,559
1,260,00
0 -27,700,000 24,600,000
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations. 
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S.
D. Min
Ma
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4
1.4
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-
12.3
5
53.
89
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89
0.5
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3 Ln(Small loans)
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7 0.00
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05
-
0.0
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-
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4
Ln(Small loans) (t-
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7 0.00
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05
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0.9
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2 0.00
1.0
0
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4
0.0
2
0.0
4
0.0
0
6 Ln(Firm size)
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2
1.3
6 0.00
12.
92
0.1
3
0.1
3
0.0
5
0.0
6
-
0.1
5
7
State SBA loans 
(000)
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1
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14.
53
0.0
0
-
0.0
7
-
0.0
5
-
0.0
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2
0.0
8
8
Trading revenue 
(000,000)
0.0
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0.2
5
-
26.1
6
23.
35
-
0.0
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0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
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0.0
0
9 I bank fees
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9 0.00
16.
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4
0.0
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0.6
5
-
0.0
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0.0
9
1
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0.0
4
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-
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-
0.0
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0
-
0.1
5
-
0.0
4
0.0
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-
0.0
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0.0
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1 Capitalization
0.1
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0.08
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4
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-
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5 0.00
0.9
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0.0
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0.0
4
1
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6 0.00
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-
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-
0.0
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-
0.0
4
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0.2
0
1
4 Concentration
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0.1
2 0.00
1.3
8
0.1
7
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1
0.0
3
0.0
4
0.0
5
0.1
1
0.0
6
-
0.0
-
0.0
4 2
1
5
Negative social 
PRA
0.0
0
0.0
1
-
0.02
0.0
0
-
0.3
2
-
0.5
1
0.0
5
0.0
7
-
0.3
4
0.0
7
-
0.0
5
0.0
2
0.0
8
1
6 Positive social PRA
0.0
0
0.0
0 0.00
0.0
1
-
0.1
3
-
0.1
8
0.0
5
0.0
6
-
0.1
6
0.0
0
-
0.0
5
0.0
0
0.0
0
1
7
Negative historical 
PRA
0.0
0
0.0
0
-
0.01
0.0
0
-
0.3
9
-
0.4
7
0.0
2
0.0
1
0.0
3
-
0.0
3
0.0
2
0.0
1
0.0
0
1
8
Positive historical 
PRA
0.0
0
0.0
0 0.00
0.0
1
0.0
0
0.0
5
0.0
4
0.0
4
0.2
2
-
0.0
4
0.0
0
0.0
0
-
0.0
5
1
9 Community bank
0.8
8
0.3
2 0.00
1.0
0
-
0.1
2
-
0.1
1
0.0
7
0.0
6
0.0
8
-
0.6
6
-
0.0
7
-
0.0
5
-
0.4
8
Variables
Me
an
S.
D. Min
Ma
x 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1
1 Capitalization
0.1
1
0.0
6
-
0.0
8
0.9
9
-
0.0
4
1
2 Liquidity
0.2
1
0.1
5
0.0
0
0.9
9
-
0.1
7
0.0
4
1
3 Liabilities
0.4
5
0.1
6
0.0
0
1.0
0
-
0.0
3
-
0.0
2
-
0.1
8
1
4 Concentration
0.3
3
0.1
2
0.0
0
1.3
8
0.1
1
-
0.1
3
-
0.1
6
0.2
4
1
5
Negative social 
PRA
0.0
0
0.0
1
-
0.0
2
0.0
0
0.2
3
-
0.1
6
0.1
6
-
0.1
3
-
0.0
5
1
6
Positive social 
PRA
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
1
0.3
3
0.0
5
0.0
8
-
0.1
0
-
0.0
6
0.4
1
1
7
Negative 
historical PRA
0.0
0
0.0
0
-
0.0
1
0.0
0
0.0
4
0.0
4
0.1
1
-
0.1
2
-
0.0
7
0.4
9
0.2
1
1
8
Positive 
historical PRA
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
1
0.0
3
0.0
5
-
0.1
0
0.0
0
0.0
3
-
0.1
0
0.0
5
0.2
6
1 Community bank 0.8 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 - - 0.0 0.0 0.0
9 8 2 0 0 8 5 3 5
0.0
3
0.0
2 0 4 0
All correlations greater than 0.01 are significant at a 95% confidence level. We lag all independent and control variables one year 
Table 3. Effect of Performance Relative to Social Aspirations on Credit Risk.
Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
Variables Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e
Ln(Firm size) 0.298
0.0
42
0.00
0 0.342
0.0
42
0.00
0 0.337
0.0
42
0.00
0 0.327
0.0
42
0.00
0 0.327
0.0
42
0.00
0
State SBA 
loans 0.012
0.0
08
0.14
3 0.021
0.0
08
0.00
5 0.022
0.0
08
0.00
5 0.023
0.0
08
0.00
4 0.022
0.0
08
0.00
4
Trading 
revenue
-
0.033
0.0
11
0.00
4
-
0.003
0.0
13
0.82
9 0.005
0.0
15
0.72
2 0.015
0.0
17
0.36
8 0.017
0.0
17
0.31
5
I bank fees 0.031
0.0
08
0.00
0 0.025
0.0
07
0.00
0 0.025
0.0
07
0.00
0 0.026
0.0
07
0.00
0 0.026
0.0
07
0.00
0
Profitability
-
3.213
2.2
43
0.15
2
11.89
3
1.8
94
0.00
0
11.70
9
1.8
92
0.00
0
11.03
1
1.9
03
0.00
0
11.03
7
1.9
02
0.00
0
Capitalization
-
0.206
0.2
72
0.44
8
-
0.247
0.2
53
0.33
0 -0.250
0.2
53
0.32
3
-
0.128
0.2
52
0.61
1
-
0.142
0.2
52
0.57
5
Liquidity
-
0.828
0.1
08
0.00
0
-
0.689
0.1
06
0.00
0 -0.693
0.1
06
0.00
0
-
0.697
0.1
06
0.00
0
-
0.697
0.1
06
0.00
0
Liabilities 1.922
0.1
75
0.00
0 1.520
0.1
48
0.00
0 1.509
0.1
48
0.00
0 1.509
0.1
48
0.00
0 1.506
0.1
48
0.00
0
Concentration 0.881
0.1
56
0.00
0 1.401
0.1
54
0.00
0 1.412
0.1
54
0.00
0 1.406
0.1
53
0.00
0 1.410
0.1
53
0.00
0
Ln(Small loans)
-
0.028
0.0
03
0.00
0
-
0.017
0.0
03
0.00
0 -0.017
0.0
03
0.00
0
-
0.017
0.0
03
0.00
0
-
0.017
0.0
03
0.00
0
De novo bank
-
0.089
0.0
53
0.09
0
-
0.215
0.0
49
0.00
0 -0.211
0.0
49
0.00
0
-
0.206
0.0
49
0.00
0
-
0.205
0.0
49
0.00
0
Positive social 
PRA
-
58.69
4
2.7
76
0.00
0
-
107.2
97
8.3
03
0.00
0
-
57.49
5
2.7
77
0.00
0
-
78.85
0
8.9
85
0.00
0
Negative social
PRA
-
51.11
0
2.2
61
0.00
0
-
50.68
5
2.2
57
0.00
0
-
97.48
9
7.0
03
0.00
0
-
92.64
6
7.5
78
0.00
0
Community 
bank
-
0.375
0.0
53
0.00
0 -0.582
0.0
66
0.00
0
-
0.254
0.0
48
0.00
0
-
0.356
0.0
63
0.00
0
Pos social PRA 
X CB
55.15
5
8.2
64
0.00
0
24.09
7
8.7
25
0.00
6
Neg social PRA 
X CB
54.41
7
7.3
21
0.00
0
48.95
2
7.9
19
0.00
0
Firm fixed Includ Includ Includ Includ Includ
effects ed ed ed ed ed
Year dummies
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.217 0.219 0.222 0.222
F
230.1
49
262.2
95
252.2
05
256.1
72
245.4
94
N
7340
1
7340
1 73401
7340
1
7340
1
We include, but do not report, firm fixed effects and year dummies. We lag all independent and control variables one year. We include 
robust standard errors.
Table 4. Effect of Performance Relative to Historical Aspirations on Credit Risk.
Model
6
Model
7
Model
8
Model
9
Model 
10
Variables Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e
Ln(Firm size) 0.298
0.0
42
0.00
0 0.202
0.0
40
0.00
0 0.205
0.0
40
0.00
0 0.198
0.0
40
0.00
0 0.192
0.0
40
0.00
0
State SBA loans 0.012
0.0
08
0.14
3 0.013
0.0
08
0.08
2 0.013
0.0
08
0.09
3 0.014
0.0
08
0.07
0 0.015
0.0
08
0.05
7
Trading revenue
-
0.033
0.0
11
0.00
4
-
0.003
0.0
13
0.78
5
-
0.001
0.0
13
0.91
8 0.022
0.0
14
0.10
9 0.021
0.0
14
0.12
0
I bank fees 0.031
0.0
08
0.00
0 0.027
0.0
07
0.00
0 0.027
0.0
07
0.00
0 0.026
0.0
07
0.00
0 0.026
0.0
07
0.00
0
Profitability
-
3.213
2.2
43
0.15
2 2.700
1.9
96
0.17
6 2.714
1.9
93
0.17
3 2.593
1.9
93
0.19
3 2.559
1.9
97
0.20
0
Capitalization
-
0.206
0.2
72
0.44
8 0.117
0.2
63
0.65
5 0.137
0.2
63
0.60
1 0.087
0.2
62
0.74
0 0.051
0.2
63
0.84
7
Liquidity
-
0.828
0.1
08
0.00
0
-
0.721
0.1
06
0.00
0
-
0.716
0.1
06
0.00
0 -0.707
0.1
05
0.00
0 -0.713
0.1
05
0.00
0
Liabilities 1.922
0.1
75
0.00
0 1.676
0.1
64
0.00
0 1.673
0.1
65
0.00
0 1.664
0.1
64
0.00
0 1.669
0.1
64
0.00
0
Concentration 0.881
0.1
56
0.00
0 0.920
0.1
48
0.00
0 0.916
0.1
48
0.00
0 0.938
0.1
48
0.00
0 0.946
0.1
48
0.00
0
Ln(Small loans)
-
0.028
0.0
03
0.00
0
-
0.025
0.0
03
0.00
0
-
0.025
0.0
03
0.00
0 -0.024
0.0
03
0.00
0 -0.024
0.0
03
0.00
0
De novo bank
-
0.089
0.0
53
0.09
0
-
0.014
0.0
49
0.77
4
-
0.015
0.0
49
0.76
4 -0.028
0.0
49
0.57
8 -0.028
0.0
49
0.57
2
Positive historical 
PRA
-
1.870
2.1
08
0.37
5
-
16.60
4
5.9
09
0.00
5 -2.841
2.1
05
0.17
7
21.11
0
5.8
37
0.00
0
Negative historical 
PRA
-
88.36
8
3.0
25
0.00
0
-
88.26
8
3.0
22
0.00
0
-
154.6
19
8.1
55
0.00
0
-
161.9
04
8.5
52
0.00
0
Community bank
-
0.393
0.0
53
0.00
0
-
0.417
0.0
54
0.00
0 -0.224
0.0
49
0.00
0 -0.168
0.0
49
0.00
1
Pos historical PRA X
CB
16.79
4
6.2
66
0.00
7
-
27.42
0
6.1
14
0.00
0
Neg historical PRA X
CB
78.71
4
8.5
93
0.00
0
87.17
7
9.0
71
0.00
0
Firm fixed effects
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Year dummies
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.214 0.214 0.219 0.220
F
230.1
49
245.8
43
235.5
97
241.2
36
232.3
17
N
7340
1
7340
1
7340
1 73401 73401
We include, but do not report, firm fixed effects and year dummies. We lag all independent and control variables one year. We include 
robust standard errors.
Table 5. Effect of Performance Relative to Social Aspirations on Small Business Loans.
Model 
11
Model 
12
Model 
13
Model 
14
Model 
15
Variables Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e
Ln(Firm size) 0.530
0.0
56
0.00
0 0.562
0.0
58
0.00
0 0.560
0.0
58
0.00
0 0.561
0.0
58
0.00
0 0.561
0.0
58
0.00
0
State SBA loans 0.032
0.0
09
0.00
1 0.031
0.0
09
0.00
1 0.031
0.0
09
0.00
1 0.031
0.0
09
0.00
1 0.031
0.0
09
0.00
1
Trading 
revenue -0.013
0.0
10
0.16
9 -0.019
0.0
10
0.05
7 -0.016
0.0
10
0.09
6 -0.018
0.0
10
0.06
9 -0.017
0.0
10
0.07
9
I bank fees 0.009
0.0
07
0.20
5 0.011
0.0
07
0.13
2 0.011
0.0
07
0.12
7 0.011
0.0
07
0.13
1 0.011
0.0
07
0.12
9
Profitability -6.326
1.5
85
0.00
0
-
10.79
4
1.8
23
0.00
0
-
10.82
3
1.8
26
0.00
0
-
10.81
8
1.8
28
0.00
0
-
10.79
9
1.8
26
0.00
0
Capitalization -1.444
0.2
57
0.00
0 -1.419
0.2
62
0.00
0 -1.421
0.2
61
0.00
0 -1.415
0.2
62
0.00
0 -1.427
0.2
62
0.00
0
Liquidity -1.152
0.1
82
0.00
0 -1.162
0.1
83
0.00
0 -1.163
0.1
83
0.00
0 -1.162
0.1
83
0.00
0 -1.163
0.1
83
0.00
0
Liabilities 0.391
0.1
36
0.00
4 0.438
0.1
35
0.00
1 0.434
0.1
35
0.00
1 0.437
0.1
35
0.00
1 0.434
0.1
35
0.00
1
Concentration 1.074
0.1
72
0.00
0 0.996
0.1
73
0.00
0 0.999
0.1
72
0.00
0 0.996
0.1
73
0.00
0 0.999
0.1
72
0.00
0
Credit risk -0.069
0.0
07
0.00
0 -0.035
0.0
09
0.00
0 -0.036
0.0
09
0.00
0 -0.035
0.0
09
0.00
0 -0.035
0.0
09
0.00
0
De novo bank 0.137
0.0
38
0.00
0 0.171
0.0
38
0.00
0 0.172
0.0
38
0.00
0 0.171
0.0
38
0.00
0 0.172
0.0
38
0.00
0
Positive social 
PRA
20.64
4
3.6
47
0.00
0 2.529
5.2
09
0.62
7
20.67
4
3.6
50
0.00
0 1.027
5.4
75
0.85
1
Negative social
PRA 6.227
1.9
94
0.00
2 6.273
1.9
96
0.00
2 4.156
2.5
35
0.10
1 8.560
2.5
24
0.00
1
Community 
bank 0.353
0.0
32
0.00
0 0.276
0.0
40
0.00
0 0.358
0.0
32
0.00
0 0.264
0.0
42
0.00
0
Pos social PRA 
X CB
20.48
3
5.9
75
0.00
1
22.14
4
6.3
93
0.00
1
Neg social PRA 
X CB 2.386
2.4
88
0.33
8 -2.629
2.6
30
0.31
7
Firm fixed 
effects
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Year dummies
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056
F
58.78
5
54.17
7
51.88
4
51.84
9
49.71
9
N 73401 73401 73401 73401 73401
We include, but do not report, firm fixed effects and year dummies. We lag all independent and control variables one year. We include 
robust standard errors.
Table 6. Effect of Performance Relative to Historical Aspirations on Small Business Loans.
Model 
16
Model 
17
Model 
18
Model 
19
Model 
20
Variables Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
valu
e Beta SEs
p-
value
Ln(Firm size) 0.530
0.05
6
0.00
0 0.571
0.0
58
0.00
0 0.575
0.0
58
0.00
0 0.571
0.0
58
0.00
0 0.577
0.0
58
0.00
0
State SBA loans 0.032
0.00
9
0.00
1 0.031
0.0
09
0.00
1 0.030
0.0
09
0.00
1 0.031
0.0
09
0.00
1 0.030
0.0
09
0.00
1
Trading revenue -0.013
0.01
0
0.16
9 -0.015
0.0
10
0.12
9 -0.013
0.0
10
0.19
9 -0.015
0.0
10
0.13
1 -0.015
0.0
10
0.13
8
I bank fees 0.009
0.00
7
0.20
5 0.011
0.0
07
0.14
0 0.011
0.0
07
0.14
5 0.011
0.0
07
0.14
0 0.011
0.0
07
0.14
3
Profitability -6.326
1.58
5
0.00
0 -6.564
1.6
15
0.00
0 -6.579
1.6
15
0.00
0 -6.564
1.6
15
0.00
0 -6.579
1.6
14
0.00
0
Capitalization -1.444
0.25
7
0.00
0 -1.475
0.2
59
0.00
0 -1.448
0.2
60
0.00
0 -1.476
0.2
59
0.00
0 -1.441
0.2
61
0.00
0
Liquidity -1.152
0.18
2
0.00
0 -1.126
0.1
82
0.00
0 -1.120
0.1
82
0.00
0 -1.125
0.1
82
0.00
0 -1.120
0.1
82
0.00
0
Liabilities 0.391
0.13
6
0.00
4 0.395
0.1
36
0.00
4 0.389
0.1
35
0.00
4 0.395
0.1
36
0.00
4 0.389
0.1
35
0.00
4
Concentration 1.074
0.17
2
0.00
0 1.051
0.1
72
0.00
0 1.047
0.1
72
0.00
0 1.052
0.1
72
0.00
0 1.045
0.1
72
0.00
0
Credit risk -0.069
0.00
7
0.00
0 -0.062
0.0
08
0.00
0 -0.061
0.0
08
0.00
0 -0.062
0.0
08
0.00
0 -0.060
0.0
08
0.00
0
De novo bank 0.137
0.03
8
0.00
0 0.158
0.0
39
0.00
0 0.158
0.0
39
0.00
0 0.158
0.0
39
0.00
0 0.159
0.0
39
0.00
0
Positive historical 
PRA -7.365
2.3
88
0.00
2
-
25.48
0
3.5
39
0.00
0 -7.372
2.3
92
0.00
2
-
28.46
6
3.9
48
0.00
0
Negative 
historical PRA 6.428
2.3
30
0.00
6 6.718
2.3
29
0.00
4 5.907
2.9
59
0.04
6
12.56
0
3.3
14
0.00
0
Community bank 0.352
0.0
32
0.00
0 0.323
0.0
31
0.00
0 0.354
0.0
33
0.00
0 0.304
0.0
33
0.00
0
Pos historical PRA
X CB
20.61
8
3.8
85
0.00
0
24.10
7
4.6
29
0.00
0
Neg historical PRA X CB 0.616
2.9
48
0.83
4 -6.846
3.5
26
0.05
2
Firm fixed effects
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Year dummies
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Includ
ed
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055
F
58.78
5
52.42
6
50.34
4
50.14
7
48.24
3
N 73401 73401 73401 73401 73401
We include, but do not report, firm fixed effects and year dummies. We lag all independent and control variables one year. We include 
robust standard errors.
Figure 1a. Effect of Negative Social PRA 
and Community Banks on Credit Risk.
Figure 1b. Effect of Negative Historical 
PRA and Community Banks on Credit Risk.
Figure 2a. Effect of Positive Social PRA and
Community Banks on Small Business 
Loans.
 
Figure 2b. Effect of Positive Historical PRA 
and Community Banks on Small Business 
Loans.
 
